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Abstract 
 
Using high frequency data, we examine the impact of different types of sovereign rating 
announcements on the realized skewness of stock and currency returns in the Asia-Pacific region 
over 1997-2001. We study the sovereign rating impacts on stock and currency market skewness 
using vector auto regression and panel data regression analyses. We find stock and currency 
market skewness reacts heterogeneously to ratings news and its spillover effects with the former 
being consistently more responsive. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit rating agencies are specialist information providers in international financial 
markets and they are expected to facilitate market efficiency. Yet, the informational value of 
ratings and the role of rating agencies in the international financial system remains widely 
debated.  Do sovereign ratings have significant and timely impacts on the higher moments of 
asset returns? Are their impacts equal across different financial markets? 
This paper aims to examine the effect of sovereign credit rating events on the realised 
third moment of stock and currency market returns for five advanced markets in the Asia-pacific 
region – Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and Singapore. As credit rating agencies have often 
been criticised for their inability to forewarn market participants and also for their delayed 
reactions to international financial crises (see Mora, 2006), it is important to assess the wider 
impacts of rating agencies’ guidance on the stability of stock and foreign exchange (FX) 
markets, as measured by higher moments of their realized return distributions. In particular, we 
focus on the rating impacts on realized skewness measures over the period from 1997 to 2001, 
covering major episodes of financial crises arising from East Asia (1997), Russia (1998) and 
other parts of the world. Our study is motivated by market participants’ and policy makers’ 
concern for downside risks and its contagious effects in international financial markets. 
 Sovereign credit ratings provide publicly available information on a national government’s 
ability and willingness to service its debts in full and in a timely manner and are primarily determined 
by a country’s economic fundamentals (see Afonso, 2003; Cantor and Packer, 1996). To date, the full 
extent of the impacts of agency ratings in the financial system are not well understood. This paper 
complements existing studies and adds a significantly new dimension to the academic literature on 
rating impacts in international financial markets. Whilst the significant impacts of sovereign credit 
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ratings on stock and debt market returns are established in the ratings literature (see inter alia Cantor 
and Packer, 1996; Reisen and Von Maltzan, 1999; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 1999; Brooks et al., 2004; Gande and Parsely, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; 
Pukthuanthong-Le, Elayan and Rose, 2007) the effects on the skewness of asset returns and currency 
markets have never been explicitly examined. News on sovereign debt ratings may affect both stock 
and currency markets as ratings information provide signals on future economic conditions within a 
rated country and a rating change may cause the national government to implement policies which 
affect companies’ future cashflows, thereby affecting stock returns as well as affecting general 
investor confidence and buying and selling pressures on the countries’ currency. Furthermore, as the 
asymmetric and spillover effects of ratings are established in the extant literature (Reisen and Von 
Maltzan, 1999; Brooks et al., 2004; Gande and Parsely, 2005; Ferreira and Gama, 2007) it is only 
natural to examine whether there are also asymmetries and spillovers in the rating impacts on higher 
moments of stock and currency market returns. 
 The existing studies on rating impacts predominantly use the event study methodology to 
examine the cumulative abnormal returns of stock markets in a time window of several days 
after a rating announcement to determine the impact of rating changes (see for example, Brooks 
et al., 2004; Ferreira and Gama, 2007). Instead, we first use high frequency currency and stock 
market data to compute realized skewness and then examine their financial linkages and the 
impact of ratings events within a vector auto regression (VAR) and panel data regression 
framework. The differential impacts on currencies and stock markets in the Asia-pacific during 
the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) presents a good natural experiment for ascertaining 
the impact of sovereign ratings events on realized skewness measures.  
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Overall, we find that currency and stock market skewness reacts heterogeneously to 
ratings announcements with stock market skewness being more responsive to rating news than 
currency markets in both vector auto regression and panel regression analyses. The regional 
Asian Financial Crisis only marginally affected currency market skewness. Rating effects are 
asymmetric as rating upgrades (downgrades) increase (decrease) realized skewness. Moreover, 
outlooks impact on both stock and currency markets whereas actual rating changes are 
anticipated by stock market participants and hence, not significantly reflected in realized stock 
market skewness. The impulse response functions indicate that rating shocks of all sample 
countries immediately affect both stock and currency market skewness and the effects last for 
several days. Rating shocks generally stimulate stock market skewness to a greater degree. 
However, we find only weak ratings spillover effects from Korea to other countries’ realized 
skewness measures with particularly weaker results in currency markets.  
The contributions of our paper are as follows. First, this is one of the few studies to 
provide high frequency evidence on the financial market impact of sovereign credit ratings. The 
advantages of using daily measures computed from intraday market data over day to day closing 
prices is that they provide a better representation and more robust estimate of actual price 
behaviour. Daily close-to-close measures are unable to capture the intraday price fluctuations, 
which can be substantial particularly during times of financial distress. Second, we empirically 
investigate the impacts of sovereign credit ratings on stock and currency market skewness for the 
first time. In doing so, we shed new light on the impacts of sovereign ratings on the higher 
moments of asset returns.  
This research has serious implications in light of the increased role of sovereign credit 
ratings under the new Basel II banking regulatory framework. As financial assets are marred by 
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downside risks, a clearer understanding of rating impacts on stock and currency market skewness 
will not only be beneficial for risk management by corporate treasurers, portfolio investors and 
financial institutions managers but also system stability management by policymakers. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide the data description 
followed by the empirical modelling in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss our findings before 
concluding in Section 5.  
2. Data Description 
The dataset used in this study consists of the bid-ask quote prices for both currencies 
traded and stock market indexes in five advanced countries in the Asia-pacific region – namely, 
Australia, HK, Japan, Korea and Singapore. Our sample period starts 2 January 1997 and ends 
31 August 2001.  
The currency market data used in this paper consists of the tick-by-tick exchange rates 
from Olsen and Associates for the following currencies: Australian Dollar (AUD), Hong Kong 
Dollar (HKD), Japanese Yen (JPY), Korean Won (KRW) and Singaporean Dollar (SGD). All 
currencies are quoted against the USD. The most liquid currency traded in our sample is the JPY 
with the average number of quotes being 6,923 quotes a day while KRW is the least liquid rate 
with the average number of quotes being 369 quotes a day. The stock market index data are 
captured from Reuters’ terminals and is provided by SIRCA (Securities Industry Research 
Centre of Asia-Pacific) in their TACTIQ database. These indices include the Australian 
S&P/ASX1001 (ATO1), Hong Kong Hang Seng Index (HSI), Japan Nikkei index (Nikkei), 
                                                 
1 As an alternative benchmark stock market index for Australia, we also analysed the All Ordinaries index and our 
conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged.  
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Korean KOSPI 200 Index (KS200) and Singaporean Strait Times Index (SS1). All indices are 
denominated in local currencies. The KS200 is the most liquid with the average number of 
quotes being 1,308 quotes a day while SS1 is the least liquid with the average number of quotes 
being 22 quotes a day.   
Although the foreign exchange market is a non-stop trading market, the stock market is 
not. Hence, we only consider part of the day where stock markets in the five sample countries are 
open. We therefore define our trading hours for all currency and stock markets considered as 
23:00GMT to 09:00GMT, excluding weekends. For example, Sunday 23:00GMT to Monday 
09:00GMT is considered as our Monday sample (i.e Monday for Australasia). 
In addition, we use the history of foreign currency sovereign credit ratings and credit 
outlooks and watches from Standard and Poors (S&P). We focus only on foreign currency 
sovereign ratings assessments provided by S&P as previous studies have found these exert the 
greatest impact on market returns and are less anticipated (Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; 
Brooks et al., 2004). S&P ratings announcements are generally made local a.m. time but the 
exact timing is not consistent within announcement dates. As the timing of ratings 
announcements are not consistent, we focus on daily (rather than intraday) impacts of ratings 
announcements. Following the approaches of Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama 
(2007), we linearly transform the actual ratings and outlook and credit watch guidances (on 
imminent rating changes) into a comprehensive credit rating (DUM) measure. Both forms of 
ratings guidance are intended to be forward-looking measures of the perceived ability and 
willingness of sovereign debt issuers to service their financial obligation. However, actual rating 
changes reflect perceived permanent changes in credit quality in the long-term whereas credit 
outlooks and watches indicate imminent changes in ratings over the short-term. We define a 
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“rating event” as a non-zero change in the DUM series. There are a total of 18 rating events in 
our overall sample, with Korea and HK being the most actively re-rated countries, contributing 
11 and 5 of those events respectively. 
Based on the works of Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard 
(2001) and Andersen et al. (2003),  we argue that daily realized measures calculated based on 
intraday returns provides more consistent and efficient measures than those computed from close 
to close prices. In this study, the intraday return is calculated as the log difference of the 
midpoint at time t and midpoint at time t-1. We use the mid-point quote between the Bid and Ask 
price to minimize the effect of Bid-Ask bounce, as suggested by Roll (1984). To minimise 
microstructural bias and sampling error, we use the daily realized skewness measures computed 
from 30 minute intervals for our empirical estimations.2  
Following Hutson, Kearney and Lynch (2008), we compute the daily “down-to-up-
volatility” skewness measure defined as follows: 
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where ,d tRdown  denotes a dth 30-minute return during day t that is less than the average return 
for this particular day, ,d tRup  denotes a dth 30-minute return during day t that is greater than the 
average return for this particular day, and dD and uD are the daily totals of the corresponding 
returns. It should be noted that D= dD + uD . This is a log ratio of the standard deviations of 
                                                 
2 As a robustness check, we also ran regressions with measures computed from other sampling intervals in the day. 
Our results in both vector auto regression and panel regression analyses remain qualitatively the same. We also 
performed preliminary volatility and skewness signature plots to support our selection of 30 minute intervals.  
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returns below and above the mean return. A higher value of this measure corresponds with more 
left (negatively)-skewed return distributions. 
3. Empirical Modelling  
3.1 Vector Auto Regression Analyses  
We first employ granger causality tests and impulse response analyses within a vector 
auto regressive (VAR) framework to examine the inter-relationships between rating changes and 
equity and currency market skewness. A VAR structure is presented in equation (2) shown 
below: 
1 1t t p t p t ty A y A y Bx ε− −= + + + +                                             (2) 
where ty is  a k vector of endogenous variables (i.e. realised skewness for all countries’ stock and 
currency returns and their sovereign ratings), tx is a d vector of exogenous variables (i.e. 
constants in our case), 1, , pA A and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and tε is a 
vector of innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated with their 
own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables. Using this 
framework, we ascertain the direction of potential causal relationships between skewness and 
sovereign ratings and analyse impulse response functions (IRF) from rating shocks. 
3.2 Panel Regression Analyses 
To further investigate the impacts of ratings announcements on the realized skewness of 
currency and stock market returns, we utilise a framework similar to that adopted by 
Christiansen and Ranaldo (2007) for studying intraday news effects in the US stock and bond 
markets. However, instead of using straight-forward dummy variables for capturing 
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announcement effects during the trading day, we adopt the credit rating event variables similar to 
those used in Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama (2007) for studying rating 
spillover effects from other countries in international debt and stock markets respectively. In this 
methodological fusion, we introduce a more flexible framework for investigating the skewness 
impacts of international financial crises and different types of ratings information on the day of 
release using more efficient and consistent daily realized skewness measures. 
Using pooled (panel) regression analysis, we estimate the following general model with fixed 
country and time effects to account for financial crises:  
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 ,i t i i t i t i t t i tY Event Event DUM CRISISα β β β β ε−= + + + + +   (3) 
where ,i tY is the realised skewness for stock indices and currency returns for country i on day t, 
DUMi,t is the country’s ratings level, Eventi,t  is the rating event and CRISIS is a set of dummy 
variables included one at a time to capture various periods of international financial crises 
{Asian Financial crisis - AFC, Russian debt crisis - RFC and Global Financial crises (GFC) 
which is the sum of the AFC, RFC as well as the Brazilian and Turkish financial crises (BFC and 
TFC) occurring during our sample period}.3 The financial crises dummy variables are defined as 
one on days during international financial crises and zero otherwise based on dates in Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2002) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003). The main variable of interest is 
Event and the DUM variable controls for non-linearities in market reaction relative to the 
position of each country on the rating scale. 
                                                 
3 Dynamic panel data estimations with ∆Y and instrumented Yt-1 were not appropriate.  Preliminary Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests rejected the existence of a unit root in the time series of daily realized skewness for both 
stock and currency markets. Hence, we analyse realized skewness in levels.  
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This empirical framework is sufficiently flexible to allow the base model specification to 
be extended for additional tests on the market impacts of different types of ratings information – 
specifically, downgrades and upgrades; outlook and rating changes; and rating spillovers.  
First, to separately compare the impact of downgrade and upgrade phases in sovereign ratings, 
the following model was estimated: 
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 5 ,i t i i t i t i t t t i tY Event Event DUM CRISIS Iα β β β β β ε−= + + + + + +  (4) 
where It is an indicator variable for downgrades - DG (upgrades - UG) and takes a value of one 
in the period from a negative (positive) to positive (negative) Event and zero otherwise. The bulk 
of existing rating studies find that rating downgrades have more significant impact on market 
returns than upgrades (see for example, Brooks et al., 2004).        
Second, to identify the potential differential market reactions to short-term outlook and 
long-term rating changes, the model was augmented to: 
, 1 , 2 3 4 ,i t i i t t t t t t i tY DUM CRISIS Outch Event Ratch Eventα β β β β ε= + + + × + × +    (5) 
where Outcht is a dummy variable defined as one when there is a change in sovereign outlook or 
credit watch and zero otherwise and Ratcht is similarly defined for actual ratings changes. Both 
of these variables are then interacted with the ratings Event variable to compare the separate 
impacts of outlook versus actual rating events. 
Third, in the spirit of Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama’s (2007) ratings 
spillover studies we also replace the ratings Event variable for country i with all other countries 
excluding i to determine the rating spillover effects to other sample countries’ stock and currency 
market skewness in the Asia-pacific region. Hence, the following model specification in Eq. (6) 
was also estimated: 
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, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 5 ,j t i i t i t i t j t t j tY Event Event DUM DUM CRISIS j iα β β β β β ε−= + + + + + + ∀ ∉  (6) 
 
4. Empirical Findings4 
We discuss the results with respect to first the vector auto regression then panel data 
regression analyses. Finally, we examine the rating spillover effects into other markets within the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
4.1 Vector Auto Regression Results   
To investigate the impact of sovereign ratings on our realized skewness measures, we fit 
a multivariate vector auto regressive (VAR(1)) system for sovereign credit ratings and the 
realized skewness of stock indices and currency returns. The lag length tests (sequential modified 
Log-Ratio test statistic, Final Prediction Error, and Akaike Information Criterion) all indicate 
that a one day lag is appropriate for our VAR system. Overall, we find that the spillover effects 
from ratings to realized skewness is particularly weak in currency markets compared with stock 
markets. We find lagged ratings in Australia positively affect the realized skewness of the 
Korean stock indices. We also find lagged ratings for HK has a weak positive impact on the 
realized skewness of the HKindex and Korean stock index. Furthermore, we also find that lagged 
ratings for HK positively affects the realized skewness of the Singapore stock market and 
Australian dollar. The lagged value of ratings in Korea negatively affects the realized skewness 
of the Korean Won. Finally, the one day lag of Singapore’s and Japan’s ratings do not have 
significant affects on skewness measures. This suggests that rating changes for these two highly 
                                                 
4 To conserve space, we do not report the vector auto regression results and granger causality tests but these results 
are available upon request.  
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creditworthy countries do not impart any significant effects on either downside or upside risks 
within the Asia-Pacific region. 
When we specifically conduct granger causality tests for our system of sovereign ratings 
and realized skewness series we find there are weak causal relationships across countries but 
significant ones within countries, particularly for stock markets.  
Figure 1 plots the impulse response functions for our vector auto regressive system of 
ratings and stock and currency market realized skewness along with asymptotic standard errors. 
In general, we find a ratings shock for each country in the vector auto regression system not only 
has immediate effects on its own stock and currency market skewness but also that of other 
countries and these may last for up to four or five trading days afterwards. A ratings shock will 
mostly increase the degree of realized skewness in stock markets but may reduce skewness in 
currency markets within the Asia-Pacific region (with the exception of AAA rated Singapore). 
The impacts on stock markets are generally of a larger magnitude than in currency markets. 
Again, we see evidence of a heterogeneous response to ratings information in stock and currency 
markets. 
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Figure 1. Impulse Response Functions For Rating Shocks On Stock and Currency Market Realized Skewness  
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4.2 Panel Regression Results 
Table 1 reports the estimates of the panel regression models represented in Eq. (3)-(5) for 
realized stock and currency market skewness as measured by the Hutson, Kearney and Lynch 
(2008) ‘down-to-up’ (DU) skewness measure. Consistent with their interpretation, a higher value 
of this measure corresponds with more left (negatively)-skewed return distributions. 
We find evidence that rating events have significant impacts on the third moments of 
both stock and currency returns. However, there is a different relationship in the two asset 
markets as rating events are negatively related to stock market skewness but positively related to 
currency market skewness and the effect is clearly more persistent in the former. We find 
evidence of heterogeneous responses in these two different asset markets. Interestingly, the 
skewness of neither asset markets is affected by financial crises with the exception of the 
currency market being significantly affected by the AFC at the 10% significance level.  This 
suggests that region specific financial crises play a greater role than general international 
financial crises. In terms of asymmetries, stock market skewness responds significantly to 
upgrade phases but currency skewness responds asymmetrically. The signs are consistent across 
asset markets in that upgrades reduce skewness whilst downgrades increase skewness towards 
the left.  The results suggest that most rating downgrades may already be anticipated by stock but 
not currency market participants. We find that outlook changes are also significant on market 
skewness measures, albeit more so for stock market skewness. Interestingly, currency market 
skewness is more significantly affected by actual ratings changes (5% level) than outlook 
changes (10% level). Again, this presents evidence of heterogeneous market responses to agency 
ratings guidance.  
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Table 1. Impact Of Sovereign Ratings On The Realized Skewness Of Stock And Currency Markets 
 
This table presents the panel estimation results for stock and currency market realized skewness over the sample 7/1/1997 to 
30/8/2001. Model specifications (1)-(3) are based on Eq. (3)-(5). The crisis periods are from 1/7/1997-30/1/1998 (AFC); 1/8/1998-
30/10/1998 (RFC) and the GFC includes the sum of the Asian, Russian, Brazilian (1/2/1999-28/2/1999) and Turkish (1/2/2001-
28/2/2001) financial crises. The GFC; RFC; and UG coefficient are estimated from a separate regressions to avoid collinearity issues. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 Stock market skewness Currency market skewness 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Const -1.744*** 
{0.0019} 
-1.8534*** 
{0.0011} 
-1.7927*** 
{0.0017} 
1.9640*** 
{0.0004} 
2.3767*** 
{0.0001} 
1.9858*** 
{0.0001} 
Event -0.7976*** 
{0.0047} 
-0.8150*** 
{0.0048} 
 0.5567*** 
{0.0033} 
0.5313*** 
{0.0089} 
 
Lag Event -1.1129*** 
{0.0006} 
-1.1304*** 
{0.0006} 
 -0.7520 
{0.3962} 
-0.7775 
{0.3852} 
 
DUM 0.0994*** 
{0.0021} 
0.1024*** 
{0.0016} 
0.1021*** 
{0.0019} 
-0.1133*** 
{0.0004} 
-0.1352*** 
{0.0001} 
-0.1146*** 
{0.0001} 
AFC -0.0744 
{0.5693} 
-0.0565 
{0.6636} 
-0.0596 
{0.6499} 
-0.1082* 
{0.0980} 
-0.1077* 
{0.0985} 
-0.0997 
{0.1467} 
GFC 0.1148 
{0.1877}  
 -0.0587 
{0.2299}  
 
RFC 0.0979 
{0.6259} 
  -0.0619 
{0.4927} 
  
DG  0.1333 
{0.2555} 
  0.2873*** 
{0.0001} 
 
UG  -0.1913** 
{0.0213} 
  -0.1383** 
{0.0348} 
 
Outch×Event   -1.0220*** 
{0.0010} 
  0.3494* 
{0.0530} 
Ratch×Event   -0.2357 
{0.4616} 
  0.8453** 
{0.0112} 
       
Adj. R-square 0.0048 0.0057 0.0032 0.0099 0.1361 0.0082 
No. Obs. 6065 6065 6070 6065 6065 6065 
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4.4 Rating Spillover Effects On Realized Skewness 
Table 2 presents the panel estimation results for Eq. (6). We find that within our sample, the 
other markets in the Asia-pacific region were marginally affected by Korea’s rating events but 
there were no spillovers from the other four markets’ rating events into stock and currency 
markets.5 This is not surprising given that of the more developed Asian financial markets 
studied, Korea was the worst affected during the AFC. In spite of positive granger causality 
results from the vector auto regression analyses, we find Hong Kong’s rating events did not have 
consistent spillover effects across all other sample countries. We only find evidence that realized 
skewness in stock markets were particularly responsive to rating spillover effects from Korea. 
However, the market impact of ratings spillovers are economically and statistically less 
significant than own country rating effects discussed above. Interestingly, Korean rating events 
had no spillover effects on other advanced Asian currency markets. These findings suggests that 
whilst the ratings events of advanced markets in the Asia-pacific are generally interpreted by 
market participants as country-specific news, there were common rating information spillovers 
from Korea into the other developed Asian stock markets. As Korea’s sovereign rating 
performance declined, the perception of riskiness in other Asian stock markets also increased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Only rating spillover results from Korea are presented for brevity.  
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Table 2. Rating Spillover Effects From Korea To Other Countries’ Stock and Currency 
Market Skewness 
 
This table presents the rating spillover effects from Korea to other sample countries in the Asia-
pacific region. The model specification is based on Eq. (6). The AFC crisis period is from 
1/7/1997-30/1/1998. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
 
 
 RS-stocks RS-currency 
Constant -4.0567** 
{0.0106} 
0.0077 
{0.9919} 
Event_Korea -0.5731*** 
{0.0005} 
0.0591 
{0.4585} 
Lag Event_Korea -0.0809 
{0.6246} 
-0.0246 
{0.7581} 
Dum_Korea 0.0125 
{0.3238} 
0.0086 
{0.1569} 
Dum_others 0.2097** 
{0.0147} 
-0.0076 
{0.8549} 
AFC 0.0064 
{0.9479} 
-0.0131 
{0.7804} 
   
Adj. R-square 0.0031 0.0015 
No. obs. 4852 4852 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have examined the impact of different types of sovereign rating announcements on the 
realized skewness of stock and currency returns in the Asia-Pacific region over 1997-2001 using 
high frequency data. We study the cross-country and same country rating impacts on market 
return skewness using vector auto regression and panel regression analyses.  
We find evidence of heterogeneous market responses to agency ratings guidance in 
currency and stock markets with the latter being more responsive and experiencing more 
persistent effects. Changes on sovereign credit outlooks have more significant impact on the 
realized skewness of stock markets but actual rating changes are more important in currency 
markets. We also find clear evidence that rating events have significant and asymmetric impacts 
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on higher moments of both asset market returns. That is, realized skewness increases with 
downgrades and declines with upgrades. Further, we find mute effects of global financial crises 
on the realized skewness of stock and currency returns in the Asia-Pacific and only marginal 
effects of the 1997-1998 regional Asian Financial Crisis on the realized skewness of currency 
returns. Finally, there were marginal rating spillover effects from Korea on other markets’ 
realized measures.  More developed and stable financial markets are less inclined to impart 
rating spillover effects into other asset markets in the region. 
In summary, we find new evidence that national sovereign rating events have significant 
impacts on the higher moments of stock and currency returns. Future research into the impacts of 
credit ratings on international financial markets need to recognize and account for this to fully 
capture the true extent of rating influence on asset returns.  
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